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The Effect of Judicial Expedience on Attorney 
Fees in Class Actions 
Eric Helland and Jonathan Klick 
ABST RACT 
Judges facing exogenous constraints on their pecuniary income have an incentive to reduce 
their workload to increase their private welfare. In the face of an increase in caseload, this 
incentive will induce judges to attempt to terminate some cases more rapidly. In class action 
cases, failing to grant an attorney fee request will delay termination. This conflict is likely 
to lead judges to authorize higher fees as court congestion increases. Using two data sets of 
class action settlements, we show that attorney fees are significantly and positively related 
to the congestion level of the court hearing the case. 
1. INT RODUCTION 
Richard Posner (1993) was the first scholar to develop a rational-actor 
model of judicial behavior. Recognizing that individual Article III judges 
have effectively no control over their salaries, Posner argues that judges 
are likely to work significantly less than comparable individuals in pri­
vate practice. That is, because the returns to diligence are relatively low 
for judges, judges are likely to choose a relatively high level of leisure 
in their utility maximization problem, all other things equal.! 
In the class action context, settlements are likely to be attractive to 
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1. Posner also includes a number of other arguments in the judge's utility function in 
addition to income (assumed to be given exogenously) and leisure. These include prestige , 
popularity, reputation, and avoiding reversal. 
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a judge since a settlement will reduce the· judge's workload, and it is 
unlikely that the approval of any given settlement will lower any of the 
other arguments in the judge's utility function. During the approval 
process, if a judge rejects the class action attorney fee request, termi­
nation will be delayed. The marginal cost of this kind of delay is likely 
to increase as the judge's court grows more congested. This generates a 
potential conflict between the judge'-s -desire for expedierrcy-ancthrs-ar 
her role as the monitor for the diffuse class members who are, practically 
speaking, unable to monitor their attorney's performance. 
As Hensler et al. (2000, p. 119) explain, "Largely clientless consumer 
class action litigation holds within itself the seeds for questionabLe prac:­
tices. . _ _ Procedural rules, such as the requirements for notice and 
judicial approval of settlements, provide only a weak bulwark against 
self-dealing and collusion . . . .  Judges who are constantly urged to clear 
their docket and are schooled to believe that the justice system is better 
served by settlement than adjudication may find it difficult to switch­
gears and turn a cold eye toward deals that-from a public policy per­
spective-may be better left undone." 
In addition to the general problem identified by Hensler et ai., which 
would seem to be endemic to the class action form, it might be the case 
that this problem is being exacerbated as courts grow increasingly con­
gested. The rational-actor model of judicial behavior suggests a causal 
link between court congestion and attorney fees in class action cases and 
predicts a positive relationship between court congestion and attorney 
fees in class action settlements. 
We provide an exposition of this hypothesis in Section 2 of this paper. 
We then discuss the data in Section 3 and describe the shortcomings and 
advantages of both data sources used in the analysis. Sectiori 4 examines 
the effect of congestion on the attorney fees in the data sets and provides 
evidence that our results are not driven by endogeneity. Section 5 con­
cludes. 
2. JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 
Posner (1993) posits a very simple model of judicial behavior. The de­
cision to become or remain a judge is dependent on the relative mag­
nitude of the individual's expected utility as a judge and as a lawyer. By 
assumption, the individual earns a higher income as a lawyer but con­
sumes less leisure and gets less psychic income from prestige and rep-
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utation. Posner assumes that only the leisure variable is a choice variable 
for most judges. 
There are a number of different mechanisms through which judges 
are able to increase their leisure. Posner (1993) mentions allowing court 
queues to grow by expending less time and effort on the cases at hand. 
Taking this strategy to an extreme might not be optimal, however, since 
an expanding queue could induce legislators to increase the size of the 
judiciary, which leads to a decrease in judicial prestige. Alternatively, 
the collegiality of the bench may provide enough social sanction that 
allowing the queue to increase endlessly, effectively forcing more work 
on one's fellow judges, may not be optimal behavior from the judge's 
viewpoint. Although this concern will be attenuated a bit given the public 
good nature of judicial prestige, social pressur�s within the judiciary and 
society more broadly might constrain a judge's ability to allow queues 
to grow ever longer.2 
An alternate strategy might involve seeking to terminate cases as 
quickly as possible, conditional on not making the types of mistakes 
that are likely to lead to reversal or public condemnation, which would 
decrease utility in Posner's model through the prestige and reputation 
arguments. Expediting termination in this way helps to limit the court 
queue, saving that resource for cases that are less easily terminated. This 
strategy allows for a lower expenditure of effort or, conversely, a greater 
consumption of leisure subject to the relevant constraints. 
In this maximization problem, the shadow price of additional slack 
in the queue constraint grows as court congestion increases. That is, as 
the queue resource becomes increasingly scarce because of increased 
court congestion, the incentive to terminate cases quickly grows.3 This 
relationship suggests that we should find a positive relationship between 
court congestion measures and judicial expediency, all other things equal. 
For the vast majority of cases before the judge, the optimal strategy 
is to encourage settlement (or plea bargaining in the case of criminal 
trials). Moreover, settlement is generally the optimal decision of litigants 
as well because it avoids the cost of going to trial. Further, as sc:::ttlement 
represents an agreement between plaintiffs and defendants, the judge is 
2. For example, a New York Times story singled out George B. Daniels, a federal 
district court judge in Manhattan, as leading the nation in motions pending for a period 
longer than 6 months (Weiser 2004) 
3. A formal model of this effect and empirical suppOrt from Israeli courts are presented 
by Beenstock and Haitovsky (2004). They find that judges complete more cases as their 
caseloads grow and complete fewer cases when new judges are appointed to their court. 
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generally under no obligation to review the terms of the settlement, if 
he or she is even aware of them, and under almost no threat of reversal 
on appeal. The case of class actions is slightly more complex. In the 
class action con.text, judges are supposed to monitor the interests of the 
members of the plaintiff class and ensure that they are being served by 
the proposed settlement. This monitoring is quite time intensive. 
As Hensler et al. (2000, p. 44S} describe; 
Judges play a unique role in damage class actions: Without the judge's 
decision to grant certification, a class action lawsuit does not exist. With­
out the judge's approval, a lawsuit cannot be settled. Without a judge's 
decision to award fees, the class action attorneys cannot be paid. More­
over, judges have special responsibilities while the litigation is ongoing: 
They approve the form and content of notices to class members that a 
class action has been certified or settled; they determine when and where 
fairness hearings will be held , how long they will be, and who can par­
ticipate; they decide whether non-class members can intervene in the lit­
igation, and whether lawyers representing objectors will receive any com­
pensation. Even after a case is resolved, judges may continue to play a 
role by overseeing the disbursement of settlement funds. 
Thus the ideal mechanism for reducing classc-action-related judicial 
workload, from the point of view of the judge, is expediting cases that 
are unlikely to be reversed on appeal. Monitoring of settlements by 
plaintiffs in class action cases is rarely likely to constrain a judge who 
is trying to clear his or her docket. Plaintiffs are joined together because 
it is not rational to bring individual suits in these cases. This also means, 
however, that it is not rational for plaintiffs individually to monitor the 
case closely. Moreover, attorneys have divergent interests from their cli­
ents with respect to settlement. Since the plaintiffs' attorneys can ne-· 
gotiate the fee independent of the award, and the fee is not negotiated 
with the clients but with the defendant in the case, there is an ob-vious 
agency problem. 
The other group that monitors settlements is public interest gr.oups. 
Public interest groups can challenge fees and awards, but such challenges 
are rare, which makes the judge principally responsible for monitoring 
.fees ana settlements. 
Hensler et al. (2000) provide data that give some idea of the moni­
toring judges themselves face. They find that in six of the 10 cases they 
extensively studied, class members had no objections to the settlement. 
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In the other four cases, where objections were filed, only one case resulted' 
in an appeal of the judge's decision to approve the settlement. 
In four of the 10 cases, there were interveners from or on behalf of 
the class. In two cases, other plaintiffs' attorneys w�o had filed similar 
class actions objected to the settlement. In only one case was rheinter-· 
vener a public interest attorney, and in the other, the state attorney 
general intervened�4 Only in the case of the public interes-t: law-hf·m,aoos· 
it appear that attorney fees were reduced.s In fact, Hensler et al. (2000, 
p. 463) find that in three of the cases studied, "class council received 
. more in fees and expenses than class members received altogether." 
In essence, the presiding judge determines the size of attorney fees in 
class action settlements with few external constraints. Wiliging, Hooper, 
and Niemic (1996) provide further support for the proposition that 
judges face few constraints on their behavior with respect to granting 
attorney fees in class action cases. Of the 407 cases they studied, there 
were only 28 attempted interventions of any kind, not just with regard 
to fees, and the presiding judge allowed just 13. Willging, Hooper, and 
4. The cases in which no objections were raised were Roberts v. Bausch & Lomb, No. 
CV-94-C-1144 (N.D. Ala. 1996), in which two other attorneys who filed similar claims 
settled with the defendant for fees only; Pinney v. Great Western Bank, No. CV 95-2110 
(C.D. Cal. 1997), where there was one unsuccessful intervention by- a- private attorney;. . 
Graham v. Security Pacific Housing Services, No. 2:96-CV-132 (S.D. Miss. filed April 1, 
1996); Selnick v. Sacramento Cable, No. 541907 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1996); and Inman v. 
Heilig-Meyers, No. CV 94-047 (Ala. CiI. Ct. Fayette County filed May 12, 1994). In In 
re Factor VIII or IX Blood Products (this l itigation was known as Wadleigh v. Rhone­
Poulenc Rorer Inc., No. 93 C 5969 [N.D. Ill. filed September 30 1993), it was continued 
as In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Products Litigation, MDL-986, No. 93 C 
7452 , until settlement when it became the Walker Settlement); Atkins v. Hacros Chemicals 
Inc., No. 89-23976 (La. Dist. Ct. Orleans Parish, 1996); In re Louisiana Pacific Siding 
Litigation, No. 95·879-JO (LEAD) (U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Or., filed June 19, 1995); 
and Cox et al v. Shell et ai., No. 18,844 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Obion County 1995), either 
individual class members or victims' groups objected. Only in the Blood Products. case was 
an appeal filed, and it was dismissed after defendants agreed to allow two groups of class 
members to pursue individual lawsuits . In Martinez v. Allstate Insurance Co., No. 95-08-
09169-CV (Tex. Dist. Ct. Zavala County filed August 28, 1995)/Sendejo v. Farmers In­
surance Co., No. 95-08-09165-CV (Tex. Dist. Ct. Zavala County filed August 30, 19 95) , 
the state attorney general intervened and obtained an additional $2 million for "consumer 
protection. " 
5. In Graham v. Security Pacific Housing Services, the judge allowed Trial Lawyers 
for Public Justice to intervene. In response to that intervention, plaintiffs' attorney fees 
were reduced from $5.4 million to $1 .9 million. In fact, in three of the cases the judge­
either did not inquire into or was unconcerned with (1) the likely redemption rate of 
coupons while basing the fee on the face value of the coupons, (2) the total amount the 
defendant was paying, or (3) a settlement fund that depended on plaintiffs coming forward 
to claim a $5 payment. 
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Niemic (1996) also find that while 104 cases of the 407 in their sample 
were appealed, 71 of those cases ended up being affirmed at the appellate 
level. The majority of these appeals concerned a certification ruling, with 
83 of the 104 appeals occurring after a certification ruling. The Willging, 
Hooper, and Niemic (1996) analysis suggests that a judge is at far greater 
risk of being overturned on appeal if he or she does not certify a class 
than if he or she approves a large--attO:ffleyfee; 
Clearly then, one mechanism through which judges can safely ex­
pedite class action settlements is by giving attorney fee requests little 
scrutiny. Less judicial scrutiny will enable the defendant and the 
plaintiff's attorney to enter into a bargain that maximizes their surplus 
at the expense of the class members. Specifically, since the defendant 
cares only about minimizing total costs, the split between the plaintiff's 
attorney and the class members is inconsequential to it, and it also values 
a quick resolution. The plaintiff's attorney primarily cares about his or 
her fee, and, given the diffuse nature of the interests of the plaintiff class, 
there will be little pressure to rein in the fee request from the class itself. 6 
This setup implies that as judicial scrutiny declines, attorney fees, con­
ditional on settlement amounts, will increase. 
3. DATA SOURCES 
Data problems and limitations have significantly hampered empirical 
research regarding litigation generally (see, for example, Helland, Klick, 
and Tabarrok 2005). For cases decided at trial, existing data sets are far 
from comprehensive, especially at the state level. Data on cases that 
settle before trial are even more incomplete, and since most cases are 
settled before trial, this data problem is particularly acute. Class action 
settlements, however, may prove to be an exception to this general dearth, 
of data, since court approval of the settlement terms is required. 
Regarding attorney fees in class action litigation, most. existing re­
search has been limited in its scope, focusing on only a few courts (for 
example, Willging, Hooper, and Niemic 1996) or substantive areas (for 
example, Lynk 1994). Eisenberg and Miller (2004) have taken a large 
6. Hensler et al. (2000) find that attorney fees in the 10 cases they examined ranged 
from 5 percent of the settlement to 50 percent. However, since the actual amount collected 
by plaintiffs is often smaller than the settlement fund, attorney fees as a percentage of 
damages actually collected were closer to 50 percent on average, much higher than the 
one-third fee mark that is often cited or the one-quarter fee rate found in Eisenberg and 
Miller (2004). 
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step forward in this regard by developing and analyzing a data set of 
class action settlements that spans both state 'and federal courts from 
1993 to 2002 as well as multiple litigation fields. 
The Eisenberg and Miller (2004) data were constructed from the 
Westlaw AllCases database, the Lexis Mega database, and the Commerce 
Clearing House Federal Securities and Trade Regulation Reporters. This 
technique generated 449 cases, and fee information was avaiLableinA17 
cases (Eisenberg and Miller 2004).7 In general, we follow Eisenberg and 
Miller's (2004) specification for fees with the addition of the congestion 
measures described below. We do, however, drop all state cases from 
the data set since we have court congestion data only for federal courts.8. 
The dependent variable is the natural log of the fee amount in 2002 
dollars. 
We also include several controls used by Eisenberg and Miller (2004).9 
Specifically, given their finding that settlement amount is a strong pre­
dictor of attorney fees, we control for the size of the settlement in con­
stant 2002 dollars. We also include an indicator variable that equals one 
if the fees in the case were generated via the lodestar method. This 
method essentially constructs an hourly fee and is more commonly used 
in cases without easily quantifiable damages. We include the lodestar 
control because, in cases in which plaintiffs' attorneys are explicitly 
generating a record of billable hours, it may be easier to challenge fees 
and thus reduce the fee amount. 
We also include a control, defendant pays, which equals one if the 
7. In the data set, there is one extreme outlier with respect to our congestion measures, 
a case from the Northern District of Alabama in 1999. While there is nothing particularly 
interesting about this case itself ( Garst v. Franklin Life Insurance Company, 1999 U.S. 
Dist. Lexis 22666), the Northern District of Alabama witnessed a surge in terminations 
per judgeship during that year due to the mass termination of more than 18,000 breast 
implant cases. During that year, Alabama's measure of terminations per judgeship was 
3,44 1, compared with the average of 442 in the data set. This number was high even for 
the Northern District of Alabama, which saw 843 terminations per judgeship in 1998 and 
709 in 2000. For this reason, we have excluded this case from the results we present, 
although including it does not affect the sign or the statistical significance of any of our 
results. 
8. Arguably, given the method Eisenberg and Miller used to construct the data set, 
dropping state cases may be preferable anyway, since the Westlaw and Lexis databases 
contain cases and settlements from only 20 percent of the states' state trial courts (while 
they contain cases and settlements from federal trial courts from every state), and' there is 
no reason to believe that the included courts represent a random sample of state courts. 
9. We do not present results using the Eisenberg and Miller (2004) risk variables 
because of the subjective nature of the risk determinations used in their data set. However, 
this does not affect our results. 
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defendant pays a fee amount independent of the settlement fund. While 
the expectation is that this should not affect the fee amount, that is, the 
payout is the same for the defendant in either event, it may again fa­
cilitate fee challenges. As a practical data matter, in cases where the 
defendant pays the fee, the 
,
fee is not included in the award amount of 
the plaintiff class. 
Eisenberg and Miller (2004) posit that the age of the case is a proxy 
for complexity.10 Another possibility is that the age of the case proxies 
for the time value of money if we assume that because most of the 
plaintiff's attorney's investment in the case is made early on he or she 
would need to be compensated for having to wait until settlement to 
recoup his or her investment. We include the variable following the 
Eisenberg and Miller (2004) specification. One concern is that the age 
of the case may be determined by congestion. For this reason, we have 
run the regressions with and without age (not reported), finding sub­
stantially the same results. 
We also include controls for whether the case was an appellate opin­
ion, under the assumption that concern about being reversed on appeal 
is reduced if the case has already been appealed and hence judges are 
allowed more leeway in setting fees. We include an indicator variable 
equal to one if an objection to the fees was filed. The expectation is that 
fees will be lower if an objection is filed because judges' ability to reduce 
congestion without the threat of being overturned on appeal is reduced 
if someone is actually monitoring the fees. 
We include controls for whether the settlement fund did or did not 
include soft-dollar relief. Soft-dollar relief, such as coupons or injunc­
tions, is more difficult to value, which makes it more difficult to deter­
mine the appropriate fee. Often, courts will value some soft-dollar relief 
when computing the gross settlement (as in the case of coupon settle­
ments), whereas injunctive relief is generally not valued in the gross 
settlement. We denote the former case "beneficial relief" and the latter 
as "nonbeneficial relief," following Eisenberg and Miller (2004). Our 
expectation is that in cases with beneficial relief, fees will be lower on 
the assumption that courts will view coupons as a worse deal for plain­
tiffs than cash, whereas there is likely a positive relationship with the 
presence of nonbeneficial relief, assuming the injunction is seen as so-
10. We use the term "age" to maintain consistency with Eisenberg and Miller's data 
set, however, the term "duration" might be a bit more clear, as the variable measures the 
length of time between a case's filing and its settlement. 
ATTORNEY FEES IN CLASS ACTIONS / 179 
cially valuable. We also include controls for whether the settlement class 
was identified, with the expectation that this will reduce fee amounts 
and percentages because certifying the class at least produces identifiable 
plaintiffs who might object to the fees in the case. Also, following Ei­
senberg and Miller (2004), we include dummies for case type and a 
linear time trend. 
Finally, we control for whether or not a fee-'shifting statute. applied. 
Fee-shifting statutes often apply in cases in which large cash damages 
are unlikely, such as in civil rights cases. While Eisenberg and Miller's 
(2004) original analysis of the data parses the cases between fee-shifting· 
and non-fee-shifting cases, given their belief that the underlying distri­
bution of fees between the two case types is significantly different because 
the award amounts differ substantially between them, we chose to pool 
the cases so as not to shrink an already small data set. 11 
Thus the model estimated using the Eisenberg and Miller data is 
Feei = a + (3 x Congestioni + 8 x Xi + Ci' 
where Fee is the natural log of the fee amount, Congestion is one of our 
measures of congestion, and X are the independent controls suggested 
by the Eisenberg and Miller (2004) analysis as discussed above. In one 
other divergence from the original Eisenberg and Miller (2004) speci­
fication, we cluster our standard errors by year to account for the uneven 
distribution of cases in the data set through time. Clustering by years 
effectively weights the cases such that each year's worth of cases is given 
equal weight in determining the regression parameters.12 
We make no independent attempt to verify the Eisenberg and Miller 
(2004) data. They are the most comprehensive data currently available, 
in both geographic scope and time period. Instead, we supplement the 
data with analysis from a more limited data source, the Federal Judicial 
Center's (FJC) data that were used in Willging, Hooper, and Niemic 
(1996). The FJC data cover all cases in the Eastern District of Pennsyl­
vania, Southern District of Florida, Northern District of Illinois, and 
11. We also analyzed models that allowed for interactions between fee-shiftingstatus 
and the gross settlement amount (not reported). Those models generated substantially the 
same coefficients on our congestion measures as those presented here. 
12. We are also concerned with the possibility that the Administrative Office of the 
U.S. Courts slightly changes its methodology in the collection of the congestion measure 
from year to year, so clustering by year would control for any within-year correlation of 
errors arising from measurement error in the congestion terms. Dropping this clustering 
or clustering by court instead of by year generates quantitatively similar signs and p-values 
for the coefficients on the congestion measures that are presented in our tables. 
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Northern District of California. They cover all cases resolved between 
July 1, 1992, and June 30, 1994. There are 408 cases in total, of which 
117 come from Pennsylvania, 72 from Florida, 117 from Illinois, and 
102 from California. 
The FJC data set is not a random sample but a field study. It covers 
the population of cases in that time period in those districts. The districts 
were not chosen at random and are nat'Intended' to be representative 
of all class actions in the federal courts. 
The control variables in the FJC data are extensive but suffer from. 
numerous missing values. For this reason, to maximize the useable num­
ber of observations, we do not include most of the covariates(we retain 
only gross settlement amount, the lodestar dummy, and a linear time 
trend), which leaves us with only 105 observations. However, we believe 
these data provide us with a useful robustness check since we can include 
district fixed effects to control for unobservables that may be correlated 
with fee awards and court congestion. 
For our congestion measures, we use terminations per judgeship. in 
the given court for the given year. This measure is collected by the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and is available for all district 
and circuit courts for the years 1992-2003.13 The terminations measure 
represents how many cases were disposed of in the court for the given 
year divided by the number of judgeships that exist in the court during 
that time. 
Another measure of congestion we consider is the number of filings 
made in a court per the number of judgeships in that court. This measure 
has the added benefit that the FJC actually provides a weighted measure 
of filings per judgeship that assigns a weight to each filing that accounts 
for the differing amounts of time various kinds of filings generally take 
to resolve. For example, average civil cases or criminal felony cases are 
assigned a weight of 1, while a death penalty habeas corpus case is 
assigned a weight of 5.99.14 This congestion measure arguably accounts 
for the different case mix each judge faces depending on which court 
he or she serves. Summary statistics for hoth dara sets and for the con­
gestion measures we use are presented in Table 1. 
13. Administrative Office of the u.s. Courts, Federal Court Management Statistics 
(http://www.uscourts.govlfcmstatlindex.html). 
14. For a more detailed explanation of the weighting system, see Administrative Office 
of the u.S. Courts, Explanation of Selected Terms (http://www.uscourts. govllibrary/fcmstat/ 
cmsexpI03.html). 
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4. RESULTS 
When examining the natural log of the attorney fees (in real 2002 dol­
lars), as shown in Table 2, we find a positive relationship between con­
gestion (in natural log form) and attorney fees in every- specificatiofr; 
regardless of the congestion measure we use. Using terminations per 
judgeship as our congestion measure, we observe a coefficient that is 
statistically significant at the 2 percent level. The coefficient implies an 
elasticity of .15, which means that when terminations per judgeship rise 
by 1 percent, we observe an increase in the fee amount oLt5 percent -
on average. 
Using weighted filings per judgeship as our congestion measure pro- . 
duces similar results. We observe a coefficient that is statistically signif­
icant at the 1 percent level. The implied elasticity of the regressions 
suggests that as weighted filings per judgeship increase by 1 percent, 
attorney fees increase by .08 percent. 
It might be the case that our congestion measures suffer ftom en­
dogeneity to the extent that attorneys seek out those courts that tend _ 
to award higher fees in order to file their class actions. If that was the 
case, court congestion and attorney fees would be jointly determined. 
To rule out that possibility, we present a specification in which we use 
criminal filings per judge as our measure of congestion. Criminal filings 
are likely to be orthogonal to attorney fees, which makes this measure 
a potentially good congestion proxy for our purposes since criminal cases 
will add to a court's docket. This specification also generates a positive 
and statistically significant coefficient, which implies an elasticity be­
tween fees and criminal filings of .06. 
For our covariates, like Eisenberg and Miller (2004), we find that the 
settlement amount has a statistically significant positive effect on fees. 
We find an elasticity of about .81 between fees and the settlement 
amount. This coefficient is statistically different than one, which implies 
that fees as a percentage of the settlement decline as the settlement 
amount goes up. This is also consistent with Eisenberg and Miller (2004). 
The only other covariate with consistently statistically. signilicantc.o:: 
efficients is the defendant-pays variable. We find a statistically significant 
negative effect, with fees being about 17-20 percent lower in cases in 
which the fee is determined separately from the settlement amount. We 
have no intuition as to why this might be the case. None of the other 
covariates (time trend, fee shifting, lodestar, age, appellate, objector, 
beneficial soft relief, non beneficial soft relief, and the existence of a 
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Table 2. ELasticity between Attorney Fees and Court Congestion 
(1) (2) (3) 
In(Terminations) .153 (2.82) 
In(Weighted filings) .084 (J59) 
In( Criminal filings) .061 (2.12) 
In(Gross settlement) .814 (48.18) .825 (43.01) .810 (43.64) 
Year -.003 ( .OS) -.004 (1.13) -.001 (.22) 
Fee shift .081 (1.49) .071 (2.01) .098 (1.74) 
Lodestar -.015 (.07) .012 (.51) -.017 (.82) 
Defendant pays -.198 (7.97) . -.171 (5.64) -.194 (7.59) 
Age -.003 (.05) -.000 (.03) -.004 (.71) 
Appellate -.092 (1.01 ) -.091 (.94) 
Objector -.009 (.02) -.040 (1.(}1 }. -. 01 1· (.2S} 
Beneficial relief -.025 (.92) -.034 (1.85) -.010 (.34) 
Nonbeneficial relief .071 (1.11) .046 (.76) .066 (1.05) 
Settlement class -.048 (1.42) -.040 (1.12) -.051 (1.56) 
N 297 270 297 
R2 .937 .946 .936 
Note. The dependent variable is In (attorney fee in 2002 dollars). The case data come from 
Eisenberg and Miller (2004). All regressions are estimated. with standard errors .clustered 
by year and include case type dummies. The t·statistics are in p�rentheses. The appellate 
indicator is dropped from the specification using weighted filings per judgeship because 
the Federal Judicial Center does not have this metric for appellate-level courts. 
settlement class) exhibit consistently statistically significant relationships 
with fee amounts. 
In Table 3, we present regressions using the FJC data. Since we have 
multiple observations of cases from the same courts, we can include 
court fixed effects in this set of regressions to provide confidence that 
our congestion effect is not simply the result of some unobservable court 
effect. That is, it could be the case that courts awarding high fees also 
happen to have high levels of congestion (that is, reverse causation or 
simultaneity bias). Unfortunately, because of missing observations, we 
have fee award data for only 123 cases, and that number drops signif­
icantly if we add in any covariates. If we retain the gross-settlement 
variable, our usable observations drop to 105, but given the predictive 
p0wer of settlement size, the trade�offwotlld· ap-pearto·be}us-t�ti€d. We 
can also include a lodestar dummy and a linear time trend without losing 
any more observations. We present the results using the FJC data merely 
to serve as a robustness check for our primary findings about the re­
lationship between court congestion and fees, keeping in mind that the 
ability to control for court fixed effects does provide some precision that 
we were unable to attain with the Eisenberg and Miller (2004) data. 
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In Table 3, we present results using the FJC data to examine the effect 
of our congestion measures on attorney fees. In the specifications where 
we control only for a linear time trend and district fixed effects, two of 
our three congestion measures generate statistically significant positive 
elasticities. The coefficient on criminal filings per judge, while positive, 
is not statistically significant. Once we control for the gross settlement 
amount and a lodestar dummy, aU three measures' ofcarrgestian generate· 
positive coefficients, but only the measure of weighted filings per judge 
is statistically significant. Because we have relatively little varia.tio.n.- in. 
within-district congestion, controlling for district effects limits the pre­
dictive power of our congestion measures. 
5. CO N CLUSION 
Civil litigation has a large impact on economic welfare in the United 
States. According to the 2004 Economic Report of the President, "[T]ort 
liability leads to lower spending on research and development, higher 
health care costs, and job losses" (Council of Economic Advisors 2004, 
p. 203). However, much of this cost is justified by the deterrence and 
insurance functions performed by the tort system. 
Some critics contend that we are in the midst of a torts crisis, with 
the costs of the system starting to outpace the benefits derived from it-. 
Further, some commentators argue that attorneys themselves are at the 
root of this crisis (Olson 2003). One charge levied in this line of argument 
is that lawyers who bring class action suits against firms effectively sub­
vert the democratic process by engaging in regulation through litigation 
without generating much gain for the individuals who are ostensibly 
their clients. That is, although class action suits generate substantia� 
judgments and settlements, it is claimed that an increasingly large portion 
of those proceeds are directed toward attorney fees, leaving a rdatively 
meager amount to compensate those who have been harmed. 
However, we are left with the question as to why attorneys are able 
to collect these high fees. One possibility is suggested by Posner's (1993) 
work on judicial behavior. Specifically, judges might have the incentive 
to expedite the settlement of class action cases by agreeing to attorney 
fee requests as standard operating procedure. In so doing, they decrease 
the amount of time and effort spent on the case, clearing it from their 
docket in a way that is unlikely to hurt their reputation. As court con-
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gestion increases, we should expect lawyeFs to seek and get increasingly 
high fees (see also White 2005). 
We present results from two data sets on class action settlements that 
support Posner's hypothesis. Specifically, we find a positive and statis­
tically significant correlation between court congestion and attorney fees. 
This result is robust and does not appear to be an artifact of endogeneity. 
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